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In this paper we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable
matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead
of linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential
partners. Furthermore, we may forbid certain partnerships, that is, we are
looking for a matching such that none of the matched pairs is forbidden,
and yet, no blocking pair (forbidden or not) exists.
To solve the above problem, we generalize the first algorithm for the
ordinary stable roommates problem.
Bibtex entry:
| AUTHOR | = | {Fleiner, Tam{\'a}s and Irving W., Robert and Manlove F., David}, |
| TITLE | = | {An algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem}, |
| NOTE | = | {{\tt egres.elte.hu}}, |
| INSTITUTION | = | {Egerv{\'a}ry Research Group, Budapest}, |
| YEAR | = | {2008}, |
| NUMBER | = | {TR-2008-06} |